We granted certiorari to decide whether petitioners, nonprofit private schools that prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admissions standards on the basis of religious doctrine, qualify as tax-exempt organizations under 501(c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. 501(c)(3), 1 and granted charitable deductions for contributions to such schools under 170 of the Code, 26 U. 7 The IRS counterclaimed for 0,073.96 in unpaid social security and unemployment taxes for the years 1969 through 1972, including interest and penalties. The court nevertheless rejected Goldsboro's claim to tax-exempt status under 501(c) (3), finding that "private schools maintaining racially discriminatory admissions policies violate clearly declared federal policy and, therefore, must be denied the federal tax benefits flowing from qualification under Section 501(c)(3)." Id., at 1318.
Cowan and Dennis Rapps for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs; and by Laurence H. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. Thereafter, Goldsboro filed a suit seeking refund of that payment, claiming that the school had been improperly denied 501(c)(3) exempt status. In addressing the motions for summary judgment, the court assumed that Goldsboro's racially discriminatory admissions policy was based upon a sincerely held religious belief.
Basically, all bets are off; it will be the criminalization of Christianity.
Ellis for the Center for Law and Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society; by Forest D. Raim for the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith; by John H. Lake, and Adam Yarmolinsky for Independent Sector; by Amy Young-Anawaty, David Carliner, Burt Neuborne, and Harry A. Accordingly, the court entered summary judgment for the IRS on its counterclaim. or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. Such an examination reveals unmistakable evidence that, underlying all relevant parts of the Code, is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. "A charitable use, where neither law nor public policy forbids, may be applied to almost any thing that tends to promote the well-doing and well-being of social man." Ould v.
Until 1970, the Internal Revenue Service granted tax-exempt status to private schools, without regard to their racial admissions policies, under 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U. 8 The District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina decided the action on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court also rejected Goldsboro's arguments that denial of tax-exempt status violated the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment. Section 501(c)(3) therefore must be analyzed and construed within the framework of the Internal Revenue Code and against the background of the congressional purposes.
Barber also mischaracterizes what the Bob Jones decision actually said.
It did not say “Bob Jones University could not have a ban on interracial dating,” only that BJU could not have BJU fought in court to preserve both for nearly a decade before the Supreme Court settled the matter in 1983, at which point the school had to choose one or the other, and BJU opted to keep its racist policy. The beginning of that court battle back in 1976 was the spark that set the religious right ablaze.
Holding that the IRS exceeded its powers in revoking the University's tax-exempt status and violated the University's rights under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, the District Court ordered the IRS to refund the taxes paid and rejected the counterclaim. The IRS determined that Goldsboro was not an organization described in 501(c)(3) and hence was required to pay federal social security and unemployment taxes.
After paying a portion of such taxes for certain years, Goldsboro filed a refund suit in Federal District Court, and the IRS counterclaimed for unpaid taxes. (a) An examination of the IRC's framework and the background of congressional purposes reveals unmistakable evidence that underlying all relevant parts of the IRC is the intent that entitlement to tax exemption depends on meeting certain common-law standards of charity - namely, that an institution seeking tax-exempt status must serve a public purpose and not be contrary to established public policy. (b) The IRS's 1970 interpretation of 501(c)(3) was correct.
Falwell denounced the revocation of BJU’s tax-exempt status as government interference in Christian schools in the same terms Barber is using today: “the criminalization of Christianity” and “the government against Christians.”Falwell made that argument in 1976 in defense of Bob Jones’ racial discrimination.
Matt Barber is making that argument in 2013 in defense of discrimination against LGBT people.
Racially discriminatory educational institutions cannot be viewed as conferring a public benefit within the above "charitable" concept or within the congressional intent underlying 501(c)(3). Such interpretation is wholly consistent with what Congress, the Executive, and the courts had previously declared. (d) The Government's fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. (e) The IRS properly applied its policy to both petitioners. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, post, p. REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p.
And the actions of Congress since 1970 leave no doubt that the IRS reached the correct conclusion in exercising its authority. Petitioners' asserted interests cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest, and no less restrictive means are available to achieve the governmental interest. Goldsboro admits that it maintains racially discriminatory policies, and, contrary to Bob Jones University's contention that it is not racially discriminatory, discrimination on the basis of racial affiliation and association is a form of racial discrimination.
or educational purposes" are entitled to tax exemption. With him on the briefs were Acting Solicitor General Wallace and Deputy Assistant Attorney General Cooper. Coleman, Jr., pro se, by invitation of the Court, 456 U. 922 , argued the cause as amicus curiae urging affirmance.